Obesity Prevention Policies at the Local Level: Tobacco\u27s Lessons by Diller, Paul A.
Maine Law Review 
Volume 65 
Number 2 Colloquium: Local Food || Global 
Food: 




Obesity Prevention Policies at the Local Level: Tobacco's Lessons 
Paul A. Diller 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.mainelaw.maine.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Food and Drug Law Commons, Legislation Commons, and 
the Torts Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Paul A. Diller, Obesity Prevention Policies at the Local Level: Tobacco's Lessons, 65 Me. L. Rev. 459 
(2013). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.mainelaw.maine.edu/mlr/vol65/iss2/6 
This Essay is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Maine School of Law Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Maine Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Maine 
School of Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact mdecrow@maine.edu. 
 
 
OBESITY PREVENTION POLICIES AT THE LOCAL 
LEVEL:  TOBACCO’S LESSONS 
Paul A. Diller 
LOCAL TOBACCO REGULATION AND ITS EFFECT 
EMERGING LOCAL OBESITY REGULATION 
POTENTIAL JUDICIAL OBSTACLES 
CONCLUSION 
  
460 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:2 
OBESITY PREVENTION POLICIES AT THE LOCAL 
LEVEL:  TOBACCO’S LESSONS 
Paul A. Diller 
For at least a decade, commentators have speculated that obesity is the next 
tobacco, a public health scourge that might nonetheless offer a gold mine to 
ambitious plaintiffs’ lawyers.1  Successful lawsuits, as in the tobacco context, 
might spur the food industry to reform its practices so as to help reduce the 
alarmingly high national obesity rate.  The obesity narrative, however, has not 
played out according to the same script as tobacco.  Relatively quick action by 
many state legislatures immunized the food industry to tort lawsuits seeking 
obesity-related damages,2 and the scant judicial opinions on the issue have 
skeptically assessed plaintiffs’ claims against the industry.3  While a litigation-
based strategy to combat obesity has largely floundered, legislative and 
administrative efforts have shown tentative progress.  It is in the legislative and 
administrative arenas that the campaign against tobacco use has the most to teach 
obesity prevention strategists.  In particular, local efforts to regulate the food 
industry are capable of significantly influencing the legislative and administrative 
processes at higher levels of government.4  Even where local action is ultimately 
preempted or invalidated by courts on other grounds, local action can nonetheless 
influence state and national policy in the long term by placing certain issues on the 
agendas of policymakers at higher levels of government. 
LOCAL TOBACCO REGULATION AND ITS EFFECT 
Since the public health effects of tobacco became better understood and widely 
known in the 1960s, government regulators have taken important steps to rein in 
tobacco use, particularly among minors.5  While some key policies emanated from 
                                                                                                     
 1. See. e.g., Roger Parloff, Is Fat the Next Tobacco? For Big Food, the Supersizing of America is 
Becoming a Big Headache, FORTUNE, Feb. 2003, at 50; Emily Heller, Fat Suit; Mac Headed Down 
Tobacco Road?, NAT’L L.J., Dec. 9, 2002. 
 2. See TRUST FOR AMERICA’S HEALTH, F AS IN FAT: HOW OBESITY THREATENS AMERICA’S 
FUTURE 65 (2012), available at http://healthyamericans.org/assets/files/TFAH2012FasInFatFnlRv.pdf 
(noting that 25 states have passed laws prohibiting claims for obesity-related harms from being brought 
against food vendors). 
 3. See, e.g., Pelman v. McDonald’s Corp., 237 F. Supp. 2d 512, 517-19 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) 
(dismissing claims by teenagers for obesity-related harms allegedly caused by eating McDonald’s food 
frequently). 
 4. I focus on local governments because they are at the forefront of obesity prevention strategy.  
See Paul A. Diller, Why Do Cities Innovate in Public Health?  Implications of Scale and Structure 91 
WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 17-24).  Insofar as states have regulated beyond 
the federal floor in an attempt to combat obesity, their action can influence the federal legislative and 
regulatory processes in the same way that local action can influence state and federal processes. 
 5. See e.g., Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, § 2, 84 Stat. 87, 87 
(1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1331-40 (West 2010 & Supp. 2012)) (banning tobacco 
companies from radio and television advertising and strengthening the cigarette package warning label 
requirement); see also Patrick Kabat, Note, “Till Naught But Ash Is Left to See”:  Statewide Smoking 
Bans, Ballot Initiatives, and the Public Sphere, 9 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 128, 133 (2009).  
2013] OBESITY PREVENTION POLICIES 461 
the national government, many others emerged from the local level, such as bans 
on outdoor advertising, smokefree workplace laws, and limitations on cigarette 
vending machine locations.6  Along the way, tobacco companies challenged many 
of these policies in court as impliedly preempted or otherwise unconstitutional, and 
often sought—and sometimes obtained—express preemption of such ordinances by 
state legislatures.7  Despite tobacco industry opposition, however, local efforts to 
curtail tobacco use have still diffused laterally to other cities, and some prominent 
local efforts have migrated up to the state and national levels.  For instance, 
although local ordinances banning outdoor tobacco advertising were ultimately 
deemed preempted by the United States Supreme Court,8 they effectively became 
the law of the land after the attorneys general of 46 states entered into a master 
settlement agreement with the major tobacco companies that prohibited such 
advertising.9  Similarly, some significant restrictions on the place and manner of 
tobacco sales, while initially pursued at the local level and frequently challenged by 
the tobacco industry,10 have now become national policy by Food and Drug 
Administration rule.11  In many states, a number of localities first adopted 
smokefree workplace regulations before the state legislature eventually addressed 
the issue.12  Even if not initially successful, therefore, persistent local effort to 
regulate the tobacco industry has often paid dividends by diffusing horizontally, 
vertically, or both. 
                                                                                                     
 6. See Diller, supra note 4 (manuscript at 8-17). 
 7. See e.g., Penn Adver. of Balt., Inc. v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 63 F.3d 1318, 1323-25 
(4th Cir. 1995) (challenging Baltimore’s ordinance prohibiting cigarette billboard advertising as 
preempted under federal law and as a violation of the First Amendment); Allied Vending, Inc. v. City of 
Bowie, 631 A.2d 77, 80-81 (Md. 1993) (challenging local ordinances restricting cigarette vending 
machine locations as preempted by state law); see also Kabat, supra note 5, at 138-40 (reviewing states 
that preempted local authority to regulate indoor smoking). 
 8. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 551 (2001) (holding that Massachusetts 
regulation prohibiting outdoor tobacco advertising was preempted by Federal Cigarette Labeling and 
Advertising Act (“FCLAA”)).  Although Lorillard invalidated a state restriction, its holding applied 
perforce to local ordinances as well.  But see Michael Clisham, Commercial Speech, Federal 
Preemption, and Tobacco Signage: Obstacles to Eliminating Outdoor Tobacco Advertising, 36 URB. 
LAW. 713, 739 (2004) (arguing that Lorillard could be distinguished if local ordinance was aimed at 
discouraging youth access to tobacco, rather than at smoking and health generally). 
 9. See Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement, NAT’L ASS’N ATT’YS GEN. 10, 22-23 (1998), 
http://www.naag.org/backpages/naag/tobacco/msa/msa-pdf (agreeing to “discontinue Outdoor 
Advertising and Transit Advertisements advertising Tobacco Products within the Settling States”).  
 10. See, e.g., Allied Vending, 631 A.2d at 78-81 (describing local restrictions on vending machines). 
 11. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 1140.16(c) (2013) (prohibiting sales of cigarettes and smokeless tobacco 
products by vending machine, with limited exceptions).  The Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco 
Control Act of 2009 (“TCA”), Pub. L. No. 111-31, 123 Stat. 1776 (2009) (codified in scattered sections 
of 5, 15, and 21 U.S.C.), expressly authorized the FDA to regulate tobacco products, and the FDA has 
used this authority to promulgate a number of rules that aim to restrict smoking, some of which borrow 
from local action.  See C. STEPHEN REDHEAD & TODD GARVEY, CONG. RES. SERV., FDA FINAL RULE 
RESTRICTING THE SALE AND DISTRIBUTION OF CIGARETTES AND SMOKELESS TOBACCO (2010), 
available at http://www.nacsonline.com/NACS/Government/Tobacco/Documents/CRSReport.pdf. 
 12. See Diller, supra note 4, (manuscript at 11-13).  In some states, the statewide smoking ban was 
enacted via voter initiative.  See Kabat, supra note 5, at 147 (discussing passage of statewide smoking 
bans by plebiscite in Arizona, Nebraska, Ohio, and Washington). 
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EMERGING LOCAL OBESITY REGULATION 
In the obesity context, a slate of local regulation is emerging that includes:  
trans fats prohibitions; requirements that restaurant menu labels list calories and 
other nutritional information; bans on toy giveaways with meals of low nutritional 
quality; portion caps on sugar-sweetened beverages; and the proposed ineligibility 
of soda purchase with food stamps.13  As in the tobacco context, food and soda 
industry groups have challenged some of these policies in the courts as preempted 
or otherwise illegal,14 or have succeeded in obtaining legislative preemption by 
higher levels of government.15  In other instances, however, local policies have 
weathered industry opposition in the legal and political spheres and have eventually 
migrated to higher levels of government.  For instance, New York City was the first 
jurisdiction to ban trans fats, followed by a number of other cities and counties.16  
In 2008, California became the first (and still only) state to follow suit.17  New 
York City was also the first jurisdiction to adopt an ordinance requiring chain 
restaurants to indicate the calorie counts of their products prominently on a menu 
board.18  After diffusing to a number of other local jurisdictions, and being adopted 
by a handful of states,19 a version of menu labeling is set to become national policy 
under regulations authorized by the Affordable Care Act of 2010.20  While the row 
for soft drink-specific regulation may be tougher to hoe,21 persistent local action is 
                                                                                                     
 13. See Diller, supra note 4, (manuscript at 17-24); see also Paul A. Diller & Samantha Graff, 
Regulating Food Retail for Obesity Prevention: How Far Can Cities Go?, 39 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 
(SUPPLEMENT) 89, 91-92 (2011) (listing various local obesity prevention policies). 
 14. See e.g., N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n v. N.Y. City Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114, 117-18 (2d Cir. 2009) 
(rejecting industry challenge to New York City’s menu labeling rule that was brought on federal 
preemption and First Amendment “compelled speech” grounds). 
 15. See e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-14-303(3) (2012) (preempting non-elected bodies of local 
governments from requiring nutritional information on menus); Nashville &Davidson County, Tenn., 
Proposed Regulations of the Metropolitan Board of Health Governing Menu Labeling in Covered Food 
Service Establishments (Feb. 6, 2009), available at 
http://www.tennessean.com/assets/doc/DN12800326.DOC (attempting to require restaurants with more 
than fifteen franchises to post calorie information on menu boards). 
 16. See NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., HEALTH CODE § 81.08 (2012) (banning the use of “artificial trans 
fat” in food preparation); PUB. HEALTH LAW CTR., TRANS FATS BANS: POLICY OPTIONS FOR 
ELIMINATING THE USE OF ARTIFICIAL TRANS FATS IN RESTAURANTS 7 (2008), available at 
http://publichealthlawcenter.org/sites/default/files/resources/phlc-policy-trans-fat.pdf (listing cities and 
counties that adopted a trans fat ban).  
 17. See Act of July 25, 2008, ch. 207, § 1, 2008 Cal. Stat. 1007-08 (codified at CAL. HEALTH & 
SAFETY CODE § 114377 (West 2012)). 
 18. See Notice of Adoption of an Amendment (§ 81.50) to Article 81 of the New York City Health 
Code (adopted Dec. 5, 2006), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/downloads/pdf/public/notice-
adoption-hc-art81-50.pdf (codified at NEW YORK CITY, N.Y. HEALTH CODE § 81.50 (2012)).  
 19. See TRUST FOR AMERICA’S HEALTH, supra note 2, at 65. 
 20. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 4205(b), 124 Stat. 119, 
573, 573-76 (2010) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 343(q)(5)) (authorizing the FDA to issue implementing 
regulations). 
 21. For instance, a number of proposed soft drink taxes have been defeated in the political sphere.  
See Lisa Baertlein, Soda Tax Ballot Measures Fizzle in California, REUTERS, Nov. 7, 2012, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/07/usa-campaign-california-sodatax-
idUSL1E8M6ATV20121107 (describing defeat of local soda tax ballot measures in El Monte and 
Richmond, California, in 2012); Anemona Hartocollis, Failure of State Soda Tax Plan Reflects Power of 
an Antitax Message, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2010, at A14 (describing defeat of proposed soda tax in New 
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likely to keep the issue on the state and national agendas. 
To be sure, it is by no means inevitable that local action to combat obesity will 
ultimately diffuse to other jurisdictions and percolate up to higher levels of 
government.  On this point the tobacco example is also illuminating.  But for a 
brief and (from the perspective of public health advocates) serendipitous moment 
in 2009 when one political party controlled both houses of Congress—including a 
filibuster-proof majority in the Senate—and the presidency, the bill to give the 
FDA the authority to regulate tobacco may never have become law.22  Without 
such a law, some significant tobacco controls first adopted at the local level might 
never have become federal policy.  Thus, advocates of increased regulation of the 
food industry to combat obesity should be patient, aware that many policies 
pursued at the local level might never become state or national policy.  On the other 
hand, the record of tobacco regulation—and the now emerging record of food 
regulation to reduce obesity—shows that diffusion and percolation are at least 
possible, and that cities and counties are often the leaders in adopting the most 
innovative policies.   
Thus, the best way to keep the issue of obesity prevention on the state and 
national legislative agenda is to keep pushing for more, and ever more innovative, 
regulation at the local level.  In some instances, like New York City asking the 
federal government to permit a pilot program denying SNAP benefits for soft drink 
purchase, officials at higher levels will be compelled to respond, which may bring 
more national attention to the issue and increase the pressure on higher-level 
officials to confront the underlying problem even when they disagree with the 
proposed local solution.  In other instances where local laws need no higher-level 
approval to go into effect, the food industry itself may prefer a more stringent, yet 
uniform, system of regulation enacted by a higher level of government to a 
patchwork of regulations at the local level, and thus decide to support a more 
uniform standard rather than fight local regulations tooth and nail.23  To some 
extent, this is how the process unfolded in certain states with respect to smokefree 
workplace legislation, and at the national level with respect to menu labeling 
requirements.   
POTENTIAL JUDICIAL OBSTACLES 
Where reasonably possible, as in the tobacco context, the food industry may 
                                                                                                     
York legislature in 2010).  Moreover, a state trial judge has enjoined enforcement of New York City’s 
portion cap on sugar-sweetened beverages in response to an industry lawsuit.  See N.Y. Statewide Coal. 
of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, No. 653584-2012 
(N.Y. Gen. Term Mar. 11, 2013) (enjoining enforcement of NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., HEALTH CODE § 
81.53 (2013), for violating state constitutional separation-of-powers doctrine).  New York City’s appeal 
of the decision is pending at the time of this Essay’s publication.  See Etan J. Yeshua, Appeal in NYC 
Sugary Drinks Case Set for June, FDA L. BLOG (Mar. 20, 2013, 10:29 PM), 
http://www.fdalawblog.net/fda_law_blog_hyman_phelps/2013/03/appeal-in-nyc-sugary-drinks-case-set-
for-june-decision-by-judge-tingling-cites-loopholes-and-questio.html. 
 22. See supra note 11 (discussing Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (“TCA”)); 
see also Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Earmarking Earmarking, 49 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 249, 265 (2012) 
(describing legislative history of the TCA). 
 23. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the National 
Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 29-30 (2007). 
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turn to the courts to defeat local regulatory efforts on legal grounds other than 
preemption, such as the First Amendment or the Fifth Amendment’s Takings 
Clause.24  When industry succeeds in getting courts to invalidate regulatory efforts 
on constitutional grounds, the results appear much stickier because a constitutional 
amendment is needed to overturn the decision directly.  In the preemption context, 
by contrast, if the legislature disagrees with a judicial finding of implied 
preemption, it may “overrule” the decision by merely passing a statute.25  
Nonetheless, even when courts invalidate legislation on non-preemption 
constitutional grounds, persistent local action can still change the national 
discourse.  By passing newsworthy, but perhaps constitutionally dubious (at least 
under prevailing doctrine) legislation, proponents of obesity prevention may keep 
the issue at the forefront of the national consciousness even if such legislation has 
little direct effect.26  This is not an endorsement of blatantly unconstitutional local 
action, but rather a recognition that political actors, including those at the local 
level, can influence constitutional doctrine through the regulations they enact or 
promulgate, as well as in other ways.27  Constitutional doctrine is not static; a 
regulation forbidden as “unconstitutional” by the courts at one point in time may 
eventually be permitted.  Thus, should judicial constitutional interpretation obstruct 
local efforts to combat obesity, persistent and nimble local action may offer the 
best hope for ultimately overcoming such an obstacle. 
CONCLUSION 
In sum, unlike in the tobacco context, proponents of obesity prevention 
policies will need to pursue reform largely in the legislative and administrative 
arenas since the courthouse doors have mostly closed to tort lawsuits.  But as 
tobacco demonstrates, in the legislative and administrative arenas, it is okay to start 
small.  Isolated local regulatory policy may someday spread far and wide.  
Seemingly disheartening setbacks in the courts, at the ballot box, or in state 
legislatures and Congress need not spell permanent doom.  Given the nation’s short 
                                                                                                     
 24. See, e.g., N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n v. N.Y. City Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114, 117 (2d Cir. 2009) 
(raising First Amendment challenge to New York City menu labeling regulation). 
 25. Given the partisan gridlock in Congress and the now-routine use of the filibuster in the Senate, 
“overruling” a court’s interpretation of a federal statute is more difficult than it used to be.  See 
generally Richard L. Hasen, End of the Dialogue?  Political Polarization, the Supreme Court, and 
Congress, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (on file with author). 
 26. See Rick Su, The States of Immigration, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) 
(manuscript at 8-13) (on file with author) (discussing similar dynamic in the context of issues like 
abortion, the Affordable Care Act, and medical marijuana). 
 27. See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1745, 1748-49 (2005) 
(citing examples of cities allowing gay marriage and school boards authorizing the teaching of 
creationism).  My point here is not that cities ought to “enforce” constitutional rights, a subject much 
debated among scholars of local government law, see, e.g., Kathleen S. Morris, The Case for Local 
Constitutional Enforcement, 47 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (2012), but rather that cities, like Congress, 
can take action that aims to confront or chip away at contrary constitutional doctrine (so long as they 
possess relatively strong home-rule authority).  Cf. Paul A. Diller, When Congress Passes an 
Intentionally Unconstitutional Law: The Military Commissions Act of 2006, 61 SMU L. REV. 281, 286-
87 (2008) (“Congress may also use its lawmaking power to challenge judicial constitutional 
interpretations by enacting statutes consistent with Congress' constitutional views but arguably 
inconsistent with then-current Supreme Court doctrine.”). 
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attention span in the political realm, and the difficulty of getting any issue on the 
agenda of state and national policymakers, persistent and scattered local action 
likely offers the best hope for moving forward a regulatory strategy to combat 
obesity.   
  
